



*Soldiers in the Maneuver-Stinger course receive engagement reports before employing the Stinger Missile weapon system. Instructors from the Air Defense Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla., teach maneuver Soldiers how to conduct short-range air defense operations at the 7th Army Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (Staff Sgt. Kathleen Polanco/U.S. Army)*

# Positioning air defense for re-introduction of M-SHORAD

*By Maj. Trey Guy*

There is not enough air defense to go around for what our senior leaders would like to do within the current, let alone future operating environment. That is continually highlighted with the strategic deployment of Patriot assets to the Central Command area of responsibility; counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; new and emerging deployments throughout Pacific Command, and a multitude of other requests. As divisions and corps refocus on tactical warfighting, one of the requests that have come up more frequently is for short-range air defense (SHORAD) units/leaders to support exercises as the potential adversary reverts back to a near-peer air threat.

While the air defense artillery branch, Fires Center of Excellence leaders, and others around the force initiate action to shape the future, I believe there is a plan that we can execute now to forge a stronger relationship with maneuver commanders both in the present and in the future.

Within the U.K. framework, the corps headquarters has a formation air defense cell (FADC), which is similar to what we have at the corps level in the corps air defense element (CADE). Both of these elements should provide the subject matter expertise to the corps commander and likewise divisional elements should do the same for their formations. The issue with the re-introduction of Maneuver-SHORAD

to ADA after 15-plus years of "mothballing" capability in both systems and personnel, is that we cannot just regenerate it at the drop of a hat.

As a branch we are further along on the re-growth of the personnel capability, but managing the expectations of senior maneuver commanders is an important part of this long-term solution. In order to do this we must be willing to man division area denial artillery munition (ADAM) cells and CADEs in the U.S. Army, FADCs in the U.K., and similar cells within NATO. Once these cells are sufficiently manned, the next step is to give them the training and tools to apply the division or corps commander's intent and



*Soldiers in the Maneuver-Stinger course practice target engagement with a Stinger Missile weapon system. Instructors from the Air Defense Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla., teach maneuver Soldiers how to conduct short-range air defense operations at the 7th Army Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (Staff Sgt. Kathleen Polanco/U.S. Army)*

assist subordinate formations. The training aspect of this, as discussed in an article featured on the Weekly Interceptor, is on track with programs like the Re-Redding Week prior to Command and General Staff College.

The shortfall is the manning of these cells, or personnel capacity, in both exercises and day-to-day fills. As a recent personal example, a field artillery colleague asked for any air defense information I could give him as he would be filling in leading division ADAM cell while also being the division deputy fire support coordinator. This was due to the division ADAM cell being manned under 50 percent, with no officer or senior non-commissioned officer. I know this is getting sorted out as we move forward, but this example highlights the potential inroads we can make: if we put the right leaders in division ADAM cells, then M-SHORAD starts to come back on line. With the overall shortages and high operation tempo for ADA there are many potential answers and all of

them are likely not optimal. The branch will have to decide whether these positions are prioritized over others, or should be filled with someone of less experience (i.e., a key developmental assigned major filling in for a lieutenant colonel position at division or corps). Another possible solution includes additional personnel authorizations in order to fill the mandatory requisitions.

The system capability gap is one, as a combined and allied force, that will take longer to close. The current appetite for budgetary growth to increase capability within any of our allies is less than appealing, even though it is acknowledged there is a significant capability gap to protect the force from a near-peer threat. We should not present a one-size-fits-all solution for the U.S. and our allies. We should use allies and partners to fight smarter going forward with the creation of combined and integrated air and missile defense task forces. U.S. Army Europe and 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, among others, have laid the groundwork for such

a task with exercises such as Tobruq Legacy 17. The exercise involved staffs and units from several NATO countries, along with CONUS-based air defense personnel and many others. Leveraging this type of training to forge partnerships will allow the wider air defense force to be more interoperable and therefore fight and train smarter. If we achieve this, it will aid the alliance in modern defense, and it will allow us all to focus on removing weaknesses while not lessening one of our potential adversary's strengths.

In summary, ADA and NATO allies are on the right path to reintroducing M-SHORAD into the operational environment. The steps we are making as nations, formations and individuals can and should be collated into a defined plan of action so we are focused on re-growing not only the personnel capability, but also the system capability.

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